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While most experts agree on the limitations of neuroimaging, the unversed public—and
indeed many a scholar—often valorizes brain imaging without heeding its shortcomings.
Here we test the boundaries of this phenomenon, which we term neuroenchantment.
How much are individuals ready to believe when encountering improbable information
through the guise of neuroscience? We introduced participants to a crudely-built mock
brain scanner, explaining that the machine would measure neural activity, analyze the data,
and then infer the content of complex thoughts. Using a classic magic trick, we crafted
an illusion whereby the imaging technology seemed to decipher the internal thoughts
of participants. We found that most students—even undergraduates with advanced
standing in neuroscience and psychology, who have been taught the shortcomings of
neuroimaging—deemed such unlikely technology highly plausible. Our findings highlight
the influence neuro-hype wields over critical thinking.
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INTRODUCTION
Neuroimaging is on the rise, attracting attention from both
academics and the popular media. Beyond transform-
ing the neurosciences, human brain imaging has birthed
neuroenchantment—a form of sub-judicious fascination with
brain science. As scholars, reporters, consumers, and the general
public increasingly come to appreciate the promise of imaging
technology, a tendency emerges to overestimate the present state
of knowledge and inflate our actual capabilities (Racine et al.,
2008; Slaby and Choudhury, 2011). While trailblazing techniques
permit scientists to decode basic perceptual information from
ongoing neural activity (e.g., Nishimoto et al., 2011), even the
most cutting-edge tools still shy away from reading minds and
unlocking complex thoughts (Haynes, 2012). Nevertheless, brain
scans are beginning to find their way into courtrooms as admis-
sible evidence despite admonitions from scientific experts (Farah
et al., 2014). The present study highlights the pervasiveness of
neuroenchatment and examines how neuroimaging hype often
interferes with critical judgment.
Spicing up arguments with the rhetorical accoutrements of
neuroscience may have meaningful effects on scientific reason-
ing and the believability of spurious information. A seminal study
showed that displaying colorful renderings from brain scans, rela-
tive to simple bar graphs or plain text, led individuals to attribute
more scientific merit to cognitive research (McCabe and Castel,
2008). Thereafter, however, some accounts questioned the import
of these initial findings (Farah and Hook, 2013)—citing short-
comings in the original methodology and inability to replicate
(Baker et al., 2013; Hook and Farah, 2013; Michael et al., 2013;
Schweitzer et al., 2013). And yet, the quality of brain images may
mediate their sway over critical reasoning: compared to tame
graphical representations of the brain, images that were more
three-dimensional and tangible increased the perceived quality of
neuroscience information (Keehner et al., 2011).
Whether or not brain images alter perceptions of scien-
tific arguments, situating information in a neuroscience context
appears to influence critical judgment. For example, embellishing
arguments with gratuitous neuroscience terms prompted non-
experts to rate scientific arguments more highly compared to
explanations lacking neuroscientific adornment (Weisberg et al.,
2008). Moreover, an independent group recently replicated these
findings in a large sample (Michael et al., 2013) and additional
preliminary data seem to further confirm this effect (personal
communication, Deena Weisberg). Thus, individuals from a vari-
ety of backgrounds seem to succumb to the allure of neuroscience,
whereby they fail to critically isolate pertinent information and
separate the wheat from the chaff.
Neuroenchantment may arise from a variety of psychological
sources. Often a single compelling experience can override multi-
ple scientific accounts, instigating faith in erroneous ideas. Social
psychologists have coined this phenomenon the “vividness” effect
(Frey and Eagly, 1993; Stanovich, 2012). In medicine, for exam-
ple, physicians frequently refer to anecdotal testimony to justify
treatment choices despite robust conflicting evidence from con-
trolled clinical trials (Lilienfeld et al., 2003). Furthermore, indi-
viduals commonly defer to experts when assessing the validity of
facts or arguments outside their immediate knowledge repertoire
(Keil, 2010). Such cognitive off-loading may engender uncriti-
cal consumption of information from domains highly-gated by
expertise, including neuroscience.
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Whereas most critical neuroscience studies to date have
examined the influence of encountering written or visualized
neuroimaging findings, here we decided to focus on a different
aspect. Years of experience with neuroimaging alongside many
an informal discussion with fellow imagers have demonstrated
to us that neuroenchantment extends beyond mere fascination
with high-resolution brain graphics or neuroscience vernacu-
lar. Instead, here we focus on how personal interactions with
neuroimaging technology may influence personal attitudes and
beliefs. Specifically, we predicted that even a minimal ruse would
derail critical thinking even among students trained in the sci-
ence of imaging the living human brain. The present study
examined the effects of using a sham brain scanner in a way
that provides one striking first-hand experience—capitalizing on
the vividness effect (Stanovich, 2012). We wanted to examine
whether individuals, including those who should know better,
would believe a highly dubious mind-reading procedure based on
neuroimaging.
METHODS
Fifty-eight undergraduate students (76% female, 24% male; age
range 19–46 years,M = 22, SD = 5.26) participated in an experi-
ment where a sham brain scanner, presuming to pass as new tech-
nology, allegedly allowed experimenters to unravel the thoughts
of participants based on a measurement of neural correlates.
We recruited 26 participants from an advanced undergraduate
course focusing on the relative merits and shortcoming of differ-
ent imaging techniques. These participants, withmajors spanning
psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science, comprised the
Neuro group. The professor in the course (AR) repeatedly harped
on the present impossibility of mind-reading and tested this
information on the final examination verifying that students
internalized these points. He also spoke about his background
as a mentalist—a magician who performs psychological tricks,
such asmind-reading—and led class demonstrations to exemplify
why the public often misinterprets these effects and takes them
for genuine paranormal powers. The other 32 participants were
undergraduate students unfamiliar with AR enrolled in courses
unrelated to psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science.
Upon arriving at our cognitive neuroscience laboratory for
a study on “The Neural Correlates of Thought,” participants
encountered a rickety mock brain scanner built from discarded
medical scraps from the 1960s and adorned with an old-fashioned
hair-dryer dome (see Figure 1 for images of the mock scanner,
and Supplementary material for a copy of the consent form).
We told participants that scientists at the Montreal Neurological
Institute had developed new experimental technology to decode
resting state brain activity and read the human mind. We labeled
the technology Spintronics and displayed warning signs around
the scanning equipment similar to those found in magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) environments. Couched as an exercise in
deciphering the neural correlates of thought, we asked partici-
pants to think of four items: a two-digit number, a three-digit
number, a color, and a country. Participants chose freely, wrote
the items on a piece of paper for later verification, and hid
their note in their pocket. Following a few minutes of pre-scan
preparation (e.g., taping meaningless electrodes to the face and
FIGURE 1 | The mock neuroimaging device assembled from discarded
odds and ends including a scrap salon hair dryer. Throughout the mock
scan, a pre-recorded video displayed rotating three-dimensional brain slices
with accompanying scanner-like audio, lending the appearance of collecting
and analyzing patterns of brain activity.
positioning the head carefully under the hair-dryer dome) we
asked participants to ponder each item they had chosen, one
at a time, in response to on-screen computerized instructions.
Unbeknownst to participants, the senior author (AR) taught the
undergraduate experimenter (SA) a technique used by magicians
to obtain the pocketed participant information. At the end of
the “scanning” process, the computer presented this information
on the screen with the intimation of mind-reading. Participants
completed self-report measures on a computer probing their
beliefs and subjective experiences concerning the experimen-
tal process (see Table 1 for details concerning time course and
specific questions). We fully debriefed all participants after com-
pletion of data collection.
RESULTS
Subjective ratings indicate that despite the current infeasibil-
ity of neuroscientific mindreading and the haphazard setup of
our scanner, individuals were neither skeptical nor suspicious of
the paradigm (see Table 1). Seventy-six percent of participants
believed in the mock-equipment (i.e., a rating of 4 or above on
the believability question). Further analysis using Welche’s t-tests
to correct for unequal variance revealed a distinction between
Neuro participants and students from other disciplinary back-
grounds. Neuro participants were more skeptical [t(52.29) = 2.81,
p < 0.01] and less believing of the overall paradigm [t(45) =
−2.05, p < 0.05]. Nevertheless, neuroimaging knowledge hardly
offered an effective shield against the perils of neuroenchant-
ment. Approximately 65% of neuroscience-educated individuals
reported believing the paradigm. Furthermore, comparative anal-
ysis of data collected before and after the revelation of the pock-
eted information revealed that bothNeuro andOther participants
were more likely to believe the scanner could potentially deduce
even more complex thoughts [Overall sample: t(57) = −7.48,
p < 0.001; Neuro participants: t(25) = −2.67, p < 0.05; Others:
t(31) = −9.59, p < 0.001].
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Table 1 | Subjective ratings of participant beliefs concerning the neuro mind-reading paradigm (on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 0 “not at
all” to 6 “extremely”).
Mean scores (SD)
All participants (n = 58) Neuro (n = 26) Other (n = 32)
Future Possibilities—Before the computer correctly reveals their choices “How
possible is it to use Spintronics© to unravel your thoughts with even more
complex information (i.e., a visual image or an abstract concept)?”
2.38 (1.53) 2.00 (1.36) 2.77 (1.36)
***
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
*
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
***
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Future Possibilities—After the computer reveals their choices—Same question as
above
3.88 (1.77) 3.46 (1.94) 4.16 (1.57)
*︷ ︸︸ ︷
Believability—“How ‘believable’ are these results to you?” 4.44 (1.93) 3.96 (2.09) 4.96 (1.53)
**︷ ︸︸ ︷
Skeptical—“How skeptical are you of the results?” 2.66 (2.13) 3.42 (2.04) 1.94 (1.93)
Suspicious—“How suspicious are you about this experiment?” 2.73 (1.91) 3.00 (1.60) 2.44 (2.11)
Participants answered all questions after the mock scan in the order listed here. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that interacting with a brain scanner, even
one as sketchy as our glorified hair-dryer apparatus, clouded
critical judgment and rendered dubious facts believable. Most
participants not only accepted the procedure as unfeigned but
also willingly extrapolated about the potential capacities of the
machine. Moreover, even individuals well-versed in the short-
comings of brain imaging succumbed to the neuroenchantment
of the sham scanner—despite acquiescing that their professor for
the course and principle investigator for the present study (AR)
formerly performed as a professional magician. For these partic-
ipants, an encounter with technology that is purportedly capable
of unveiling personal higher cognition eclipsed academic knowl-
edge concerning the implausibility of such phenomena. Thus,
here we show how our experimental context can lead individuals
with various levels of expertise to accept science fiction as neuro
fact.
Human beings are infamously irrational when entertain-
ing certain beliefs (Kahneman, 2011). Studies probing magical
thinking show that individuals often uncritically accept anoma-
lous events even when they do not understand the underly-
ing causal relationships (Subbotsky, 2004). Similarly, even for
our educated participants, one awe-inspiring encounter with a
sketchy brain scanner overruled months of information acquired
through a university course addressing the limits of neuroimag-
ing. Participants in our study appear to have slackened their criti-
cal faculties when confronted with neuroscientific equipment in a
university laboratory. Thus, our study demonstrates how encoun-
tering information in a neuroscience laboratory may cloud criti-
cal thinking, even when the experience is highly implausible and
presented in a farcical manner. The present experiment, however,
does not permit dissociating the persuasive influence of neu-
roimaging contexts from the more general effects of encountering
experts in a laboratory setting. Future work would need to further
unravel such nuances.
CAVEATS
First, although we deliberately crafted our experimental setup
to elicit critical judgment by appearing absurd and ramshackle
(see Figure 1), we did not directly measure whether participants
perceived the visual form of the scanner as implausible; however,
informal reactions from participants affirmed this impression.
Second, an alternative interpretation of our findings might pro-
pose that instead of a reasoning error participants responded
appropriately by deferring judgment to scientific specialists given
the experimental context. After all, individuals are not nec-
essarily wrong or naive to believe in facts or causal systems
outside their expertise—especially given evidence that the sys-
tem works as promised. Our experimental account, however,
makes no attempt to resolve these overarching philosophical
questions.
CONCLUSIONS
Speculating beyond the present data, participants in our study
appeared to concurrently agree with two conflicting worldviews.
The first is the scientific stance of under-promise-&-over-deliver,
which construes brain imaging as an imperfect but potentially
powerful technique with a strong mandate for discovery. The
second is the more popular over-promise-&-under-deliver men-
tality, which portrays brain imaging as an omniscient strategy for
unscrambling the neural correlates of thought. Fueled by popu-
lar media and lay accounts, neuroenchantment further blurs fact
from fad and leads to accepting tentative suppositions as indis-
putable fact (Racine et al., 2008; Slaby and Choudhury, 2011).
Our results suggest that familiarity and academic proficiency may
prove moderately effective as safeguards against neuroenchant-
ment; yet, even participants explicitly educated about the limits of
neuroimaging succumbed to our simple trick, albeit less so than
their naïve peers. We are presently investigating how education
may disarm the persuasive influence of neuroimaging. We hope
to report on these findings before long. Critical thinking in neu-
roscience will likely develop as an imperative asset to negotiate the
potential pitfalls of a neuro-hype climate.
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